



Washington, D.C. 20505

29 August 2019

Mr. Ryan Weisensee
MuckRock News
DEPT MR 50149
411A Highland Avenue
Somerville, MA 02144-2516

Reference: F-2018-01046

Dear Mr. Weisensee:

This is a final response to your 4 March 2018 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for **records pertaining to CIA involvement in any and all government programs involving inviting or bringing foreign students to study at American universities and colleges in the period Jan 1, 1955 to Dec 31, 1965.** We processed your request in accordance with the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended, and the CIA Information Act, 50 U.S.C. § 3141, as amended.

We completed a thorough search for records responsive to your request and located the enclosed document which we determined can release in segregable form with deletions made on the basis of FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3). A copy of the document is enclosed.

Additional material was determined to be currently and properly classified and must be denied in its entirety on the basis of FOIA exemption (b)(1), and other material on the basis of FOIA exemptions (b)(3). Exemption (b)(3) pertains to information exempt from disclosure by statute. The relevant statutes are Section 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as amended, and Section 102A(i)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended.

As the CIA Information and Privacy Coordinator, I am the CIA official responsible for this determination. You have the right to appeal this response to the Agency Release Panel, in my care, within 90 days from the date of this letter. Please include the basis of your appeal.

If you have any questions regarding our response, you may contact us at:

Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505
Information and Privacy Coordinator
703-613-3007 (Fax)

Please be advised that you may seek dispute resolution services from the CIA's FOIA Public Liaison or from the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) of the National Archives and Records Administration. OGIS offers mediation services to help resolve disputes between FOIA requesters and Federal agencies. You may reach CIA's FOIA Public Liaison at:


703-613-1287 (FOIA Hotline)

The contact information for OGIS is:

Office of Government Information Services
National Archives and Records Administration
8601 Adelphi Road – OGIS
College Park, MD 20740-6001
202-741-5770
877-864-6448
202-741-5769 (fax)
ogis@nara.gov

Contacting the CIA's FOIA Public Liaison or OGIS does not affect your right to pursue an administrative appeal.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Mark Lilly' with a stylized flourish at the end.

Mark Lilly
Information and Privacy Coordinator

Enclosure

WER

10-3929

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
 THROUGH: Deputy Director (Intelligence) *nd*
 SUBJECT: East-West Exchange Program

Quaker

1. This memorandum is for information only.
2. On a number of occasions over a period of months, we have had discussions with Ambassador Lacy on various facets of the East-West Exchange Program. We are generally in accord in regard to the methods which can be used

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3. The question of internal security responsibilities has been a difficult one to solve and the Department of State has been hard-pressed to carry out the recommendations of the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security in regard to the Program. In an attempt to solve this problem, the Under Secretary of State has forwarded a memorandum to the Attorney General with a supporting memorandum prepared by Ambassador Lacy.

4. At a meeting with Ambassador Lacy on Thursday, 15 May 1958, the Deputy Assistant Director for Operations asked Ambassador Lacy to provide us with copies of the above memoranda. It is possible that the Under Secretary of State may call you in regard to this matter, and we are, therefore, for your information attaching copies of the two memoranda with the note of transmittal from Ambassador Lacy.

ER-
 SECURITY NO. 44
 CONTROL NO. 2011
 DATE 2/4/81
 ENCLOSURE

George G. Carey
 GEORGE G. CAREY
 Assistant Director for Operations

cc: DDCI
 DD/I

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY

May 16, 1958

CIA

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Joe:

Here is the letter to the Attorney General
and a memorandum in support of it, which we
discussed yesterday.

Will you please see that it reaches the
Director?



William S. B. Lacy

Attachments:

May 15, 1958, letter to Attorney
General from Under Secretary
Memo to Under Secretary from
W.S.B. Lacy

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S/EWC - Amb. Lacy

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May 15, 1958

Dear Bill:

You will recall that last November 1 we discussed the general question of East-West Exchanges, the internal security implications and the recommendations of the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security applicable thereto. At that time you suggested that we explore

I am informed you have

received a copy of Allen Dulles' memorandum to the Secretary of March 11, 1958, wherein CIA expresses its willingness to help support the Exchange Program but clearly states that it cannot assume any internal security obligations.

While discussing these issues with the CIA and since receipt of the March 11 memorandum of the Director of the CIA, we have been attempting to carry out the recommendations of the ICIS with regard to the East-West Exchange Program. In doing so, we have encountered real and substantial difficulties. Accordingly, I would like to have an early opportunity of discussing this whole problem again with you. Because the problem is so involved, I have asked my staff to prepare a background paper suitable for

use in

The Honorable
William P. Rogers,
Attorney General.

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use in the discussion. This paper is designed to outline as explicitly as possible which Department or Agency does what in the attempt to further the East-West Exchange Program and at the same time develop such internal security measures as may be possible.

I enclose a copy of the background paper mentioned above. It is informal and meant only for discussion purposes.

I hope you will look it over at your earliest convenience and that you will let me know when we could get together with a view to discussing the attached paper and working out an approved understanding.

With warm personal regards,

Most sincerely,

/s/ Christian A. Herter

Under Secretary

Enclosures:

Background paper on East-West
Exchanges and Internal Security.

Clearances:

SCA - Mr. O'Connor

EE - Mr. Leverich

SCA:JPMcDonnell:ml
May 6, 1958

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To: U - The Under Secretary
Through: S/S
From: S/EWC - William S. B. Lacy
Subject: East-West Exchanges and Internal Security

NSC 5508/1 (approved on March 26, 1955) dealt with a policy of limited East-West exchange. Upon approval of NSC 5508/1, the Inter-departmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS) was asked to establish minimal security requirements. The ICIS recommended a system involving the use of sponsors, interpreters, monitors, conductors, etc., to be attached to visiting groups for the purpose of surveillance and reporting on their activities. For such a limited program, the system of sponsors, etc., was workable.

NSC 5607 (approved on June 29, 1956) recommended an expanded program of East-West exchanges. Shortly after the enactment of NSC 5607, the Hungarian revolt occurred and the Exchange Program was in a state of suspension. Last summer the Program was revived to some extent and Soviet willingness to enter into a formalized program led to the Lacy-Zaroubin negotiations which culminated in the US-USSR agreement signed on January 27, 1958. The security criteria under which this Program has been conducted have remained basically unchanged since its inception in 1955. The ICIS, on October 2, 1957, "codified" its recommendations with regard to security.


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REVIEWED BY: _____
DATE: 4/3/87
REVIEWER: 018373

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Difficulties in carrying out the ICIS requirements were anticipated and Governor Herter discussed with Attorney General Rogers on November 1, 1957 the whole problem of sponsorship requirements, surveillance and reporting. The Attorney General stated at that time that the Department of Justice could not accept the responsibility of maintaining surveillance of Soviet bloc exchange visitors. Further, the Attorney General rejected the proposition that as a matter of policy, regardless of what sponsorship arrangements were made by other agencies, the Department of Justice was responsible for the internal security aspects of the East-West Exchange Program.

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The Attorney General earlier and the Chairman of the ICIS on April 1, 1958 have both indicated that the Department of Justice did not regard itself as responsible for internal security "in connection with the East-West Exchange Program." If this means that the Department of Justice has none of the operating responsibilities for arranging visits, sponsors, etc., under the Exchange Program, as contained in the present ICIS recommendations, we concur; however, we cannot agree that the Department of Justice can, nor do we believe it wishes to, divest itself of responsibility for internal security in connection with the East-West Exchange or any other Governmental program, which constitutionally and statutorily rests with that Department.

At the April 1, 1958 meeting of the ICIS, some members were uncertain whether the security recommendations applied to all visitors from Eastern European countries or, if not, to which visitors. It seemed generally agreed that delegations officially negotiated between this Government and a Soviet bloc government fall within the meaning of these requirements, whereas "tourists" did not. Because of these uncertainties and the desirability of having precise definitions, there are outlined below certain categories of visitors to the United States from the Soviet bloc countries together with what arrangements seem to be feasible from the security standpoint. Where arrangements are made by other agencies to afford a limited form of coverage to such visitors, it should be clearly understood that such arrangements are at best

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merely an "alarm system" designed to achieve urgent notification to the Department of Justice of any suspicious activities coming to the attention of the persons affording coverage. In establishing such a system, the agencies are attempting to assist the Department of Justice to discharge its constitutional and statutory responsibilities with regard to internal security.

Category 1 - Persons who are members of delegations visiting the United States under officially-negotiated exchanges wherein the subject matter, itinerary, duration, etc., have been negotiated between the United States and a particular Soviet bloc government.

For such visitors, the Department of State will arrange for sponsors, tour directors, interpreters, etc., as has been done since the inception of the Program.

Category 2 - Persons traveling to the United States to attend meetings or conferences for which the United States Government is the host (including conferences being sponsored by individual government agencies).

The Department of State will arrange sponsorship, etc., for such persons.




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(b)(1)
(b)(3)Category 4 - Tourists

As stated above, the ICIS agreed that tourists were not meant to be included under the now existent "sponsorship" arrangements. The Departments of State and Justice have had separate consultations with Mr. Ralph Reed, President of the American Express Company. The American Express

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Company has now opened an office in Moscow and anticipates obtaining a large percentage of the Soviet tourist business to the United States. It is striving to obtain the same type of business from the rest of the Soviet bloc. Attempts are being made to arrange visits to the United States in "package tours" and for the groups to be accompanied by a tour director. The tour director would be briefed about the interests of the Department of Justice and would be expected to report to Justice any suspicious activity on the part of the visiting aliens.

Category 5 - Commercial Visitors.

This includes Soviet bloc purchasing missions temporarily in the United States; persons running government exhibitions at trade fairs, etc.; or any other individual whose purpose in coming to the United States is to transact business for a Soviet bloc government or a subsidiary thereof. It has not been possible in the past to arrange sponsorship and State does not plan to do so in the future for such visitors.

Category 6 - Other Visitors.

NSC 5607, the present policy of this Government with regard to East-West Exchanges, embodies the 17-point proposal submitted by the United States at the Geneva Foreign

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Ministers' meeting in December 1955 as the objectives of the Program. Items 12 through 14 recommend increased contacts, including visits to the United States, by persons in the professional, cultural, scientific, academic and sports fields. Soviet bloc citizens responding to private invitations from their counterparts in the United States to visit the United States are not capable of being handled by the sponsorship mechanism. In addition to private visits, some individuals in the fields listed above have come and will continue to come to the United States to attend privately-sponsored conferences and meetings. It is not possible to arrange sponsorship for such visitors.

Recommendations:

1) That the Department of State continue to arrange sponsorship for exchange visitors falling within categories 1 and 2 as defined above;

2)

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3) That the Department of Justice undertake to determine what security measures should be instituted consistent with NSC 5607 as regards persons falling within the meaning of categories 4, 5, and 6 discussed above; and

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4) Since any controls instituted over foreign visitors have foreign policy implications, that the Department of Justice consult with State before instituting any overt controls over Soviet bloc visitors.

Concurrences:

SCA - Mr. O'Connor

EE - Mr. Leverich

SCA:JPMcDonnell:mles:5/7/58

Clearance:

SCA - Mr. O'Connor

EE - Mr. Leverich

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